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1. Introduction: Empirical work in Argumentation Theory
A position that undergirds Tomasi’s paper on the study of judgments in legal arguments I quote
directly from Tomasi: “Ethos and pathos are not in the ‘suburbs’ of cognition and are not an
alternative route: logos ethos and pathos are not alternative or parallel ways of persuasion but
interlaced” (p. 9). Argument-making and argument-having is complex. Theorists like Brockriede
(1975), Willard (1978), Gilbert (1994), and Hample (2005) - among others - put forward theories
that recognize the social aspects of argument, the arguers. In this paper Tomasi describes and
explains the parameters around an empirical research project that investigates to what extent
emotion influences judges’ final decisions in legal arguments. This is a project that also
emphasizes social aspects (i.e., emotion) involved in arguments. As the term emotion is
widespread, Tomasi first articulates important criteria of emotion and related concepts. Then the
author concentrates on the epistemic feelings of judges. Tomasi ends the paper with an explanation
of the connections between legal arguments and epistemic feelings. Tomasi’s paper recognizes the
layers of complexity in the process of argument-making.
I applaud the empirical efforts of this project, as it is important for the field of
argumentation to develop theories validated by real arguments. I share the following responses to
Tomasi’s paper, in an effort to broaden the conversation generally in a helpful way (i.e. more about
argumentation theory generally, and less about particular arguments made in legal cases). First,
there are critiques of science that have explained the impossibility of neutrality in human decisionmaking. These works corroborate Tomasi’s point that judges’ legal arguments cannot be based on,
or assessed with, solely rationality - this is simply insufficient (Tomasi, p. 4). Second, I
demonstrate how implicitly inferring epistemic feelings function similarly to conversational
implicatures in conversations and enthymemes in argument. I end with a discussion of the potential
idealism that may be apparent in acknowledging and working with epistemic feelings in
argumentation. This has nothing to do with Tomasi’s ideas, and more to do with our culture’s
detachment from emotion. A sense of awareness is expected when investigating epistemic feelings
that perhaps is not simple, or inherent, for some individuals (judges or researchers for that matter).
Overall, this investigation contributes value to the argumentation literature, and especially to
emotion in argument.
2. A Judge is not superman
I borrow some criteria about argument from Brockriede (1975) that, I think, supports Tomasi’s
research agenda. Brockriede states that arguments can be found in the vicinity of people (1975, p.
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179); succinctly put, they are a social activity. Arguments occur because some x needs to be solved
or justified, and arguments are based on perceptions arguers have (Brockriede, 1975, p. 181). This
depiction of argument drives home the point that neutral stances, or arguments following
normative parameters or expectations, are not always practical. In fact, a study of arguments made
by people will likely shed light on how argumentative decisions, or claims, are influenced in large
by aspects of the arguer (e.g., arguer bias, arguer experience, arguer-selected research, etc.).
Tomasi begins her paper by questioning the extent to which judges may be influenced by the
emotions displayed by others in a court case (p. 1). In essence, if judges are influenced by
emotional displays in the context of a legal case (and why wouldn’t they be? They are humans,
not superman), then to what extent are judges’ perceptions being shaped by what they hear?
I offer a parallel analogy related to knowledge construction. Feminist epistemologists, for
example, question the knowledge scientists rely on to make decisions in their empirical research from deciding what to study, how to study it, how to analyze findings from a study, etc. (see
Longino, 1990; Fricker, 2000; among others). If different cultural contexts, social conditions,
educational backgrounds, and so on give rise to (obviously) diverse belief systems and worldviews,
then it follows that decisions within the realm of science originate from particular people and their
particular choices. That a scientist decides to study a, and not b; that a scientist has hypothesis c
and not d or e; that a scientist uses methodology f; all these choices that are executed may be
derived from intuition, not neutral knowledge. And, yet, a point epistemologists referenced above
make is that these findings are generalized and then extrapolated as universal knowledge.
Knowledge is multi-dimensional, diverse, and we do not all have access to the same
knowledge. While the critiques of science are for the purpose of illuminating the exclusion of
particular voices and experiences in the construction of knowledge, the point is relevant to judges’
decision-making. Judges experience their own situatedness - this does not disappear when they
assume the role of judge. Others involved in the court systems also speak, and present views, from
their limited situatedness. This is not a criticism, but rather an observation. How judges are
influenced by others in their legal arguments involves these epistemological processes, and often
implicitly. If these critiques of epistemology are not enough to support the process of emotions
influencing judges’ legal arguments, de Sousa (1987, 2009) claims that emotions play a crucial
role in rational decision-making (p. 139).
3. Epistemic feelings as a variation of an enthymeme in argument
To quickly summarize epistemic feelings, Tomasi references de Sousa’s four categories: wonder,
doubt, certainty, and familiarity (p. 3). These feelings lie below the surface of conscious
deliberation, and they guide evaluative appraisals (de Sousa, 2009, p. 140). While they guide us in
such intellectual activity, epistemic feelings are intuitive in nature (Tomasi, p. 4). Sometimes we
may be aware of our epistemic feelings, and other times they become explicit because some
subsequent event or thought occurs. This is Tomasi’s point - a judge may not be aware of his/her
epistemic feelings, though they can be inferred from his/her judgments. In the study of the Court
of Appeal in Trento Tomasi describes, judges would be interviewed on their reactions to the
parties’ speeches.
Grice discusses the concept of a conversational implicature (1975), which aids individuals
conversing to fill-in-the-blanks that are left out of conversation. A conversational implicature is
not explicit to a listener in a conversation, but s/he understands the meaning intended by a speaker
if each participant in the conversation is abiding by the cooperative principle and implying
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meanings intended. We have a similar mechanism in arguments - enthymemes. Missing
components of arguments are obvious to arguer and audience, even if they are never explicit. In
fact, an arguer him/herself may need to think about whether, and what, enthymemes are present in
his/her own argument. It is possible that epistemic feelings work analogously to conversational
implicatures and enthymemes - they are obvious, if unmentioned, components of a judge’s
decision, just as conversational implicatures and enthymemes are obvious but implicit to
audiences. The interviews of judges in the research study Tomasi discusses function as a
methodology for helping us flesh out our emotions related to evaluative appraisals. The questions
help us fill-in-the-blanks in a culture where we are removed, or distanced, from emotion (i.e.
valuing, studying, emulating logic and rational processes over other sub-personal processes). The
point that I make here is that the process Tomasi describes already has accepted terminology and
methodology in conversation and arguments, where what is implicit can be made discursive.
Perhaps we can use a parallel method for filling-in-the-blanks for what is intuitive in the
development of legal arguments (or arguments in general). This is more challenging than it sounds,
of course.
4. Cultural shift with respect to emotion
It is particularly challenging to be aware of how one is affected by others’ emotion, how it
influences the audience’s thoughts and decisions, because emotion itself is rather elusive, or an
unpracticed mode of being, at least in Western culture. If we rely on value-hierarchical thinking
(i.e., thinking that subscribes to rational normative frameworks) then we are trained to develop,
access, and respond to, etc. thoughts in a discursive manner (Warren, 1988) rather than with
emotional awareness. Quite frankly we are out of our element when it comes to truly
understanding, using, receiving our emotions. And, so, it is quite conceivable that judges’
decisions can be influenced by their responses to parties’ speeches in a legal framework.
My concerns lie with the challenges in uncovering epistemic feelings, even if guided by
questions. There may be individuals who are distanced from emotions, or who may not know how
to articulate how others affect them. Cognitive behavioural therapy is a therapy process that can
help individuals change their thought patterns once they come to an understanding of interlinking
patterns of thinking, behaving, and feeling. For example if a judge believes that socio-economic
factors - which are uncontrollable - can influence individuals to steal (thought), then a judge may
compensate for being in a middle-class social bracket by donating money to panhandlers
(behaviour), and the judge may feel more care towards thieves on trial compared to other judges
(feeling). Making a judgment based on an emotional speech can play a role in how such a judge
reacts in specific cases. It takes time to recognize knowledge of these processes, but it does not
follow that it is impossible.
Tomasi shares some of the questions asked of judges (pp. 6-7), recognizing that judges
may be analyzing their behaviour, thoughts, and feelings - and so the questions focus on the facts
of the case that are related to epistemic feelings. The study relies on the responses to fact-based
questions to infer emotions that influence decisions. Tomasi shares that a subsequent study would
ask judges explicit questions related to emotions as reasons for decisions and associated epistemic
feelings (p. 7). I am a bit weary of how to analyze judges’ answers to even the factual questions.
For example, one question asks whether something disturbed the judge while the parties spoke. If
a judge answers with low, or moderate, or high - how does this connect with epistemic feelings?
What are we inferring? How do we know if the judge him/herself knows if they were disturbed?
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Do we need a definition of what it means to be disturbed? This type of study requires an audience,
and perhaps even researchers, with a sense of unskewed awareness. This in itself is oxymoronic,
though, as the goal of the study is to help uncover implicit processes with emotion that judges
remain unaware of.
5. Conclusion: You know it because you feel it
There are theorists who have discussed emotion in argument (Gilbert, 1994; Plantin 2004, 2011;
Ben-Ze’ev, 1995; Walton, 1992; and so on). Tomasi takes the discussion of emotion in a particular
direction with respect to judges’ decisions, and Plantin (2011) is referenced. Ben-Ze’ev (1995)
may also help this endeavour, as he states that emotions have cognitive, evaluative, motivational,
and feeling aspects. They are considered different aspects of a single state. For Ben-Ze’ev emotions
can be reasons for a conclusion rendered. Analogously, a judge’s legal argument can be
influenced similarly by his/her emotional state (even if not explicit to the judge him/herself) with
these four criteria of emotion in the background. Epistemic feelings, like Ben-Ze’ev’s account of
an emotional argument, can be functional in that they aid judges in making decisions.
I await the results of the study, not because I do not trust emotions are indeed affective, in
that “you know something because you feel that” (Tomasi, p. 9) but because the analyzed data
would i) help us visualize and understand the connections of pathos, emotion, and decisionmaking, ii) shine a light on subjects’ perceptions and self-awareness; iii) tell us if whether the
analysis of data (who analyzes and how are they analyzing it) needs to be revisited. The latter two
remain concerns for me, though I expect they can be addressed.
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